The topic of this paper is how best to get a project made by different parties in the general case when the project may require cooperation and there can be chance events in the decision trees of the participants. We consider the tendering strategy of the issuer by which he maximizes his minimum possible payoff, and we will show that it makes each participant interested in the same as the total interest, and this way the issuer gets the maximum possible payoff.
Introduction
How to get a simple task made as cheap as possible using tenderig is equivalent to the single unit sealed bidding problem, which has a great literature. For example, Revenue Equivalence Theorem states that in some special cases, the expected revenue of the bidder does not depend on the bidding strategy. Some tests show that in practice, different strategies gain almost the same expected revenues, but we have no practicable theory about the general case. Maybe that is why more general cases have not really been discussed before.
In this paper we will consider the case when the issuer called Issuer wants to get such project made that probably requires more than one party, cooperatively. For a simple example, if a project consists of two subtasks, the second can start only after first succeeds and the project should be ready for a certain event, and there are randomnesses in the work of the parties, then the second should work either faster but more costly or cheaper but less fast depending on the completion time of the first one. So this problem includes not only the above-mentioned general bidding problem but the problem of making the parties interested in cooperativeness, too. In fact, the problem always consists of these two subproblems. More precisely, these are
• getting the total profit of the applicants as few as possible
• getting the total profit of the players as large as possible
We will show a simple tendering strategy by which we will reach the second aim and which is good at the first aim in competitive setting. This way we avoid the difficult bidding problem and we get a simple solvable problem.
In the case when the project consists of only one part, the optimal method is simple. Issuer tells his utility function, that is how much utility the different outcomes -delivery time, quality, etc. -gains him, and then the applications are "if the utility of my work will be u then I will require u − x payment" (that can be negative), and by that Issuer's payoff will surely be x. So clearly, Issuer chooses the application with the greatest x. This guarantees that the interest of the applicant will be the same as the total interest, that is the interest in getting the greatest possible utility minus total cost.
An equivalent description of this method is that each applicant can submit any well-defined offer for contract, and Issuer chooses the one by which his minimum possible payoff is maximal. Essentially, this will be our method in the general case.
This way Issuer must be absolutely mistrustful, that is he should not believe in the probabilities told by possibly lying applicants. But he accepts for example the following.
"We agree that if you say any x amount of money before our unsure event with 2 possible upshots, then in the first case, we will pay you px, but in the second case you have to pay us (1 − p)x."
If the applicant has p probability to get the second case then expectedly he does not come off badly by this offer. And if the second case is better for Issuer by m, that is in the second case he will get m greater payoff as in the first case, then he should choose x = m, because this way he will surely get the mean of the two payoffs with the weights of their probabilities, so he cannot come off badly even if the given probabilities are wrong. This way we charge the responsibility of each unsure event to the liable party.
We will show that if Issuer foreshows that he will care only about his minimum possible payoff, that is why he will choose the x-es this way, then the best for the applicants will be submitting applications corresponding to their real decision trees, and if they do so then the total payoff will be the largest possible and Issuer's payoff will be fixed.
Example for the method
We will consider a project that is very risky, but may gain huge utility. It consists of two tasks, one application per task must be accepted, and if both succeed (in time) then Issuer will get a large sum of money, that is 60 here, but if either fails (is not ready in time) then making the other task will have no use. After getting all applications, Issuer evaluates all pairs of them for the different tasks and accepts the pair producing him the most payoff. This example shows the evaluation of a pair.
The first two trees describe the two applications in the following meaning. The different courses of the working process are shown by the paths from the root to a leaf. The solid squares show the decision points, at which the appilcant offers Issuer to choose on which branch to continue. It describes his possible decisions for example choice of faster or cheaper shipment, number of employees, etc. The other branching points are the chance events. This describes the effect of something like an error, a failure of equipment, weather conditions, illness or simply faster or slower progress concerning the work. In this example, which way to continue is chosen randomly with 1/2 probabilities for each branch, and the applicant agrees in taking any risk with 0 expected value. The numbers denote asked payments called costs in the case of the corresponding branch. At the bottom tick denotes the success and cross denotes the failure.
First applicant asks 2 units of money beyond his expenses. His task is either started at the beginning with a cost of 5 and probability of the success of 1/2, or he makes preparations for the cost of 1, and later if Issuer wants he can try to complete the task for the cost of 6 with probability 1/2. In the other application, the cost plus the desired expected payoff of the other task is 7 and the probability of the success is 1/2. The timing of the events are represented by their heights. The third tree is a "product" of the two trees, that is it describes the aggregate process of the two processes. We can construct it by following the applications by time, and creating an appropriate branching if it occurs in one of them, and then continue this on both branches. At the bottom, tick denotes the success of both tasks, and cross denotes the failure of either; and the number is the total payment asked by the applicants. We define the values of the endstates as 60 if both tasks succeeds and 0 otherwise, minus the total payments. We define the valuesdenoted by italics -of all states from the bottom to the top. Values of states in a same edge are the same. The value before a decision point is the maximum of the values after. The value before each chance event is the mean of the values after.
This way Issuer surely gets the value of the starting state, because at the decision points he asks the decisions by which the value of the state remains the same, and at the chance events he pays the signed difference between the values of the states after and before, and at the end, he gets the value of the endstate. And each applicant gets the costs of his process, his asked extra payment and some random payment with expected value 0.
For the first applicant this means that Issuer asks him -a bit surprisingly -to work by the second way, that is to make only preparations, and then Issuer either asks him to do nothing and he gets 3, or Issuer ask him to try it, and he gets 9 and ±30 for the risk, so he gets 39 if he succeeds, and he pays 21 if he fails. For the second applicant this means that he will get 12 besides his costs if he succeeds (that is 19 in total), but Issuer will deduct 12 from his payment (that is he should pay 5) in the case he fails. (We note that these extremly high risks are only the peculiarity of this simple and risky example and are not of the method.)
For the sake of simplicity, sets may be represented by a sequence of its elements, and we may omit some arguments of functions.
The model
There are a player I called Issuer and some other players A i called applicants. Each applicant has a stochastic decision tree T (A i ), that is a rooted branching tree structure consisting of the following terms.
The inner nodes of the tree are of two kinds: the chance events and the decision points. To each chance event we assign probabilities to the edges leaving it. The third kind of nodes are the leaves. Each of them has an outcome and a cost assigned. There is a time (an absolute point in time) assigned to every node, and for each edge the time assigned to the parent is not later then to the child.
The meaning of the tree is the following: the different courses of the process are the paths from the root to a leaf. In the case of a path, the outcome of the leaf is achieved at its time for the cost of the leaf. At a decision point, he can choose on which branch to continue. At a chance event, which branch to continue is chosen randomly with the probabilities assigned. The time of this point is when he learns the outcome of the event. Chance events of different applicants are assumed to be independent.
Definition 1 Communication is set of time stamped messages. Application a of an applicant A is a function {outcome} × {communication between him and Issuer} → R, describing his asked payments in the different cases.
Equivalently, application could also be defined as a pair (communication protocol between him and Issuer, {outcome} × {communication with the protocol} → R.
The process of the game is the following.
1. Each applicant learns his decision tree and Issuer learns a utility function u : {set of outcomes} → R.
2. Each applicant submits an application.
3. Issuer accepts or rejects each application.
4. Applicants with accepted applications can work according to their decision trees, and they can communicate with Issuer. Issuer can communicate with the applicants.
Denote the set of all applicants by App and the (multi)set of their submitted applications by app.
We define the payoff p of the players. The payoff of a rejected applicant is 0. If Issuer accepts applicants A 1 , ...A k , and the achieved outcome, the communication and the cost of A i are O i , M i and C i , respectively, then
Our method will be efficient only in a competitive setting between the applicants. It will be defined in various ways at the proofs of the equilibrium, sometimes by using the Bayesian model about the information of the applicants. However, until that part, we will consider the decision trees and the utility function as fixed. So the expected value E will apply only to the chance events.
We assume that the strategy of Issuer described later can be declared in public.
3 The tendering strategy
Issuer declares that he chooses the strategy that maximizes his minimum possible payoff, that is he makes this strategy of him common knowledge before the process starts.
Definition 2 For each set S of applications, we define the payoff from the applications denoted by pf(S) as this maximum of Issuer's minimal payoff if he gets these applications.
The fair strategy
We will define the prime cost application corresponding to a decision tree T , denoted by pc(T ). For the sake of lucidity, we describe it not in the form of function but in the following way. This application consists of the decision tree and the offer for the following. At each decision point the applicant chooses the branch Issuer asks for. At each chance event he informs Issuer about which branch the process continues. Before the time of this chance event, Issuer may assign some money to each branch such that their mean weightened by the probabilities is 0. At the end, Issuer has to pay the cost of the leaf and all moneys assigned to the branches of the chance events in which the process continued; and the applicant has to deliver the outcome corresponding to the leaf in time.
f a(T, x) = pc(T ) + x is called a fair application for any x ∈ R called profit. Fair or prime cost strategy F x or F 0 of an applicant means submitting a fair or prime cost application, and in the case of acceptance, choosing the decisions corresponding to Issuer's choice at each decision point, and at each chance event, telling Issuer the branch corresponding to the effect of the event. Clearly, the payoff of an accepted applicant with strategy F x is x.
Evaluation of fair applications
In this subsection we describe precisely the evaluation shown at section 1.1.
Consider each fair application with profit x as a prime cost application of the decision tree with x more cost in each leaf.
Combined decision tree of set of applicants means their overall decision tree. We construct it by following the trees, and creating an appropriate branching in the combined tree if it occurs in one of the trees, and then we continue on all branches. The outcomes of the combined tree are the sets of the appropriate outcomes. (So the combined outcomes are all one-outcome-per-application sets.)
Issuer evaluates all subsets of app, and accepts all applications in one of the best sets. Consider the evaluation of such subset. We handle the set as a combined application meaning the offer for contract with all in the set. Clearly, combined application of prime cost applications is the prime cost application of the combined decision tree.
We note that combined applications can easily be written in the form of application, but we omit the details.
A state of a decision tree means a point (not necessarily vertex) of the graphic tree like in Figure 1 .
Definition 3
The value v of a state of a combined decision tree means the maximum of Issuer's minimum payoff if he would accept the prime cost application corresponding to the decision subtree from the state.
Clearly, the value of the starting state is the maximum of Issuer's minimum payoff provided that he accepts this set of applications. We can determine the value of each state by recursion, using the followings.
• The value of an endstate is the utility of the set of the outcomes, minus the total costs.
• Values of states in a same edge are the same.
• If the values after a decision point are given, the value before the point is their maximum, as Issuer will clearly choose the more favourable option.
• Theorem 1 If the state before a chance event is S and the states after are S 1 , S 2 , ...S n and the probabilities given by the applicant are w 1 , w 2 , ...w n , respectively, then v(S) equals
Proof Assume that the event occurs randomly with the given probabilities and then Issuer surely gets the value of the state after. It does not affect the value of any state. In this case the moneys assigned to the branches by Issuer does not affect his expected payoff, so his expected payoff is x, so the value of this state is at most x. On the other hand, w i (v(S i ) − x) = 0, so if Issuer assigns v(S i ) − x to the ith branch then he gets x in all cases.
Our recursion also shows that Issuer would get the value of the starting state as a fix payoff.
4 Optimality of the tendering system
Optimality of fair strategy
If all applications are fair and Issuer maximizes his minimum payoff after the choice of the applicants then Issuer's payoff would be fixed whichever set of applications he would have chosen, so he chooses such set by which his payoff is the largest possible.
Definition 4
We define the payoff of the system denoted by p s as the sum of the payoffs of all players. The interest of the system or of a player means the interest in getting more expected payoff.
The payoff of the system is a function of the strategies of the players and of the chance events. It is equal to the utility of the set of the outcomes minus the sum of the costs of the applicants.
The total payoff of the applicants depends on the competitive setting and it is essentially independent of the tendering system. (For a reason, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem states independence in special cases.) That is why approximately the more the payoff of the system is the more Issuer's payoff is.
Theorem 2 If all accepted applicants are fair then they choose the decisions by which E(p S ) is the largest possible.
Proof After choosing the applicants, E(p s ) depends only on what decisions would be made at the decision points of the combined decision tree. We will show that our method chooses the decisions by which E(p s ) is the largest possible.
We can determine this maximum expected payoff at each state by the same way as with the values of the states. At each leaf, the expected payoff of the system equals the value of this state plus the profits of the applications. All the other three relations with values of states are valid with the maximum expected payoffs of the system, too. So by induction, we get that the previous equation holds for every state, including the starting state. So the maximum possible E(p s ) equals the payoff from the applications plus the profits of the applications, which equals E(p s ) with Issuer's declared strategy.
Moreover, if the applications are only about fair then E(p s ) is almost the same large, as follows. Assuming that the decision trees are large and complex enough, E(p s ) is approximately a differentiable function of the strategies of the applicants, in a corresponding mean. That is why the expected loss is at most proportional to the square of the difference of the strategies from the fair ones.
Interest in fair strategy
In this section, we will show the interest of the applicants in fair strategy in the case of competitive setting. As competitive setting is not a defined term, we will define this different ways as follows.
The basic results
Theorem 3 The expected payoff of an applicant A with accepted fair appliaction f a(T, x) is the profit x.
Proof By definition, f a(T, x) = pc(T ) + x = C(A) + (some random value chosen by Issuer, but all with the expected value of 0) + x, whence
When we compare possible applications of an applicant to find his best choice, we compare the cases when he submits one of them. For the sake of simplicity, we do not handle the case of ties, but we assume a strictly best combination of applications.
Definition 5 The value v of an application is the payoff from all applications constraining Issuer's strategies with he must accept this application. The value of a fair application is the value of the prime cost application minus the profit. So for a particular applicant there is exactly one fair application with a given value.
Theorem 4 For an arbitrary applicant A and value, if every other applicant is fair then the fair strategy of A gains him the most expected payoff among all such strategies that use an application with this value. Moreover, in this case E(p s − p(A)) does not depend on the strategy of A.
Proof Consider again the profits of the other applicants as constant costs, so their stategies are considered to be prime costs; it does not modify the interest of the system. As the acceptance depends on the value, the only nontrivial case is when the value is big enough to accept.
Let us consider the payoff of the players depending on the strategy of A.
Consider now the case when A submits a not fair application with the value, and Issuer accepts this. Compare this unfair case to the fair case when he applies with his fair application with the same value.
In the fair case the expected payoff of the system is not less because of Theorem 1. The expected payoff of every other applicant is always 0. Issuer's minimum payoff in the unfair case is the same as his fix payoff in the fair case, as his minimum payoff equals the value of this application. But Issuer's payoff equals the expected payoff of the system minus of all other applicants. Hence, the loss the system suffers in the unfair case will damage this particular applicant.
Second price tendering
Definition 6 Surplus value of an application a means v + (a) = pf (app) − pf (app − a). The second price tendering differs from our model only in Issuer pays to each accepted applicant the surplus value of his application. The original model is called first price tendering.
In this section, the assumption we use is that the strategies of the applicants in first and second price tenderings differ approximately only in constants in the applications. This way the following theorem results the approximately fairness of the applicants.
Theorem 5 In the second price tendering, prime cost strategy of all applicants is a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof Let us use all functions in the first price mean except the payoffs, but denote by p 1 the payoff in the first price mean. The payoff of the system is the same in both means.
Consider an applicant A and assume that all other applicants use prime cost strategy. Using the equations
and if b is the prime cost application of B then E(p(B)) = v + (b), we get
pf (app − a) does not depend on a. If A uses prime cost strategy, too, then p(I) is fixed so equation holds; and Theorem 2 shows that it gains maximal E(p s ).
Furthermore, if a = pc(T (A)) is accepted then E(p s ) = v(a) > pf (app − a) else E(p s ) = min(p 1 (I)) = pf (app) = pf (app − a). So prime cost strategy gaines E(p s ) − pf (app − a) expected payoff if it is positive and the application is rejected if it is 0. This with the inequation shows the optimality of the prime cost strategy, whence we get the proof of the Nash-equilibrium.
In spite of this theorem, in the general case we prefer the first price tendering because second price tendering does not work good against cartels.
The general result
This section is only a help for the depper understanding of the limits of the validity of the optimality.
Let the signed surplus value of an application a be v ± (a) = v(a) − pf (app − a). Clearly, v + (a) = max(v ± (a), 0).
Let us use the Bayesian model of the information of the applicants. Let us fix all (maybe mixed) strategies of the applicants but a strategy S of a particular applicant A. Denote by a the application by S. Expected value will mean of both the choice of Nature and the chance events. Let f (S) = E(p(A)|S), x be the value by which f (F x ) is the largest possible, and B = v ± (F 0 ), (D|D < B) . Theoretically, let us allow only for A to submit a strategy F a in which he submits the fair application with the same value as v(a) would be if he would have submitted a instead.
Proof a is accepted if and only if v ± (a) > 0 that is D < B.
From f (S) = P (a will be accepted)E(p(A)|S, a is accepted), we get f (F e ) = P (e < B)e, and f (F a ) = P (D < B)e, whence we get the provement.
• If e ≤ 0 then f (S) ≤ 0 = f (F 0 ) ≤ f (F x ) so S is not a good strategy. That is why assume that e > 0.
In practice, B and D are almost independent and both have single simple distributions, so P (E(D|D < B) < B) is probable not smaller than P (D < B). That is why (P (e < B) − P (D < B))e is probable nonnegative. We note that if S is fair then D is constant, so both sides are the same.
• Theorem 4 states that if the strategies of the other applicants are fair then f (
), so assuming that the strategies of others are almost fair and, as they also want to maximize their payoff, A cannot decrease their expected payoff so much, and the payoff of the system is almost maximal if and only if S is almost fair, too, then f (F a ) − f (S) is never so much less than 0, and is great for really not fair strategies.
•
by the definition of x.
This shows that if the strategies of other applicants are not so far from a fair strategy then the best strategy of A is almost fair, that is why the equilibrium should be near to fair strategies.
Case of coalitions
Consider the case when applicants form coalitions.
Submitting more applications by the same applicant is equivalent to submitting one application in which the applicant shows all and offers Issuer to choose some of them. That is why forming a coalition is almost equivalent to considering them as one player with their combined decision tree. The only difference is that the combined strategy set of a coalition is only a subset of the other strategy set, but includes all fair submissions. With the latter form, all theorems of the optimality holds, so Issuer's loss caused by the cartels is only the unavoidable loss by their anti-competitiveness.
Conclusion
In our model, if Issuer declares at the beginning that he will use the strategy of maximizing his minimum payoff, then the following statements are true:
• The expected payoff of an applicant with accepted fair strategy is fixed.
• For an applicant A and for any value v, if every other applicant is fair then the fair application of A with value v gains him more expected payoff in the case of acceptance than any other application with this value. (Issuer accepts the applications with the most value.)
• If every applicant is fair then the payoff of Issuer is fixed, and he chooses such applications by which his payoff is the largest possible.
• If every applicant is fair then after choosing the applications, every applicant makes such decisions by which the expected payoff of the system is the largest possible.
Increasing the cost in an application yields more payoff in the case of acceptance, but decreases the chance of acceptance; we do not deal with the question of how much cost is the best choice to submit with. What we need to see is considering the applications with a given chance of acceptance, the fair application yields the most expected payoff for the applicant in the case of acceptance.
Usually, applications with the same chance of acceptance means something very similar to applications that will have the same value, however these values depend on all applications. For example, if applicants submitting for the same task (that is exactly one of them must be accepted) learns all other applications then these determine the value of every possible application for this task, so surely the more value of an application for this task has, the more chance it has for acceptance. So what Theorem 3 states is about the following. If every other applicant is fair then any fair application gains him more expected payoff in the case of acceptance than any other application with the same chance of acceptance. Moreover, if an applicant submits a less precise application and by this the system works with some errors, then the loss caused falls entirely on him, and has no effect on anybody else.
The reason why the payoff of the system is what we want to maximize is the following. Assuming that for each subtask of the project, the expected payoff of the chosen applicant for this task depends only on the task and the competition, these payoffs are essentially independent of the tendering system (considering rational tendering systems). Therefore Issuer's payoff is expected to be maximal if and only if the payoff of the system is maximal.
The only exception is when Issuer chooses the applicants to contract with. Because for example, if an applicant offers to send Issuer some goods for 10, another for 9, then Issuer surely accepts the second offer, however if the costs of production are 7 and 8, respectively, then this is not the best choice for the system. Here Issuer chooses the best for himself, that is he chooses the set of applications by which his expected payoff -that equals the expected payoff of the system minus of the applicants -is maximal. So we maximize the expected payoff of the system only after choosing the applications, and we want Issuer to choose such applications by which his payoff will be maximal.
Appendix

Syntax of precedences
Consider the following example. Applicant A has to transport some material to applicant B, who cannot work without this material. In the formal description, all outcomes of the decision tree of A must contain the delivery time t 1 , and of B must contain the time t 2 when he uses the material first. We consider the cases when the precedence t 1 ≤ t 2 does not hold as possible cases but with −∞ as the value of the utility function.
Modifications during the process
In practice, players do not learn their very difficult decision trees in explicit forms. That is why they can present it only in a simplified, approximating way. As we will see, it does not worsens the optimality so much. Even so, this loss can be much more reduced by the following observation.
Assume that someone whose application has been accepted can refine his decision tree during the process. It would be in the interest of the system to allow him to carry out such modifications.
The question is: on what conditions?
The answer is for us to allow modifications of applications, if the applicant pays the difference between the values of the actual states with the original and the new applications. From another point of view, considering the possible applications with the restriction of the earlier communication, an applicant can exchange his application to another one with the same value in the restricted mean. As it is shown above, exchanging to his really fair application is in his interest, and his interest in the modifications is exactly the same as the interest of the system in it.
From another aspect, this means that modifications are regarded as chance events with 0 probabilities in the original application, because such chance events do not alter the value of the application. (More precisely, we consider the limit of the cases when the probabilities tend to 0.) It may happen that in the beginning it is too costly for some applicant to explore the many improbable branches of his decision tree, especially if he does not yet know whether his application will be accepted; but later however, it would be worth exploring better the ones that became probable. This kind of in-process modifications is what we would like to make possible. We will show that the interest of each applicant in better scheduling of these modifications is about the same as the interest of the system in it.
The expected payoff of an applicant A with an accepted fair application is fixed and for a nearly fair applicant, the small modifications of the other applications have negligible effect. As the modifications of each applicant have no influence on Issuer's payoff and only this negligible influence on the expected payoff of other applicants, the change of the expected payoff of the system is essentially the same as the change of the expected payoff of A. This confirms the above statement.
On the other hand, it is clear that if the utility function is somewhat modified, then everything can be rescheduled according to the new goals. Moreover, Issuer is also interested in describing his utility function in the same schedule as it is in the interest of the system.
Simplifications and the case with no parallel tasks
The messages Issuer sends depend only on the earlier messages he got. That is why if an applicant is sure that Issuer gets no message from anyone in the time interval I = [t 1 , t 2 ] then, without decreasing the value of his application, the applicant can ask Issuer to send until t 1 his all messages that he would send until t 2 . Similarly, if Issuer surely sends no message during I then the applicant can send his messages he would send during I even at t 2 . Moreover, if Issuer surely does not communicate with anyone else during I then the applicant can ask Issuer to tell until t 1 what messages he would send in different cases in this interval, and the applicant can send his messages only until t 2 .
Consider a project that consists of two tasks, and the second task can only be started after the first one accomplished. The outcome of each applicant for the first task (called first applicant) consists of his completion time C 1 . The outcome of each second applicant consists of his starting time S 2 and the time C 2 he completes; and his decision tree starts with doing nothing until an optional point in time that will be S 2 , and then he can start his work. The utility function is f (C 2 ) for a decreasing function f : {time} → {money} if C 1 ≥ S 2 , and −∞ otherwise.
In this case Issuer always communicates with such applicant who is just working at the time. So using the above observation, we get simplified applications with the same values as of the fair applications.
For each applicant for the first task, this is "We ask h(C 1 ) − g 1 (h) money for any h : {time} → {money} that will be chosen by Issuer at the beginning", and for the second task this is "We ask f (C 2 ) − g 2 (S 2 ) money if we can start our work at S 2 and we will complete it at C 2 ". h(C 1 ) and f (C 2 ) describe the penalties, and the applicants choose g 1 and g 2 in such way that makes their expected payoff independent of the arguments, with their best strategy. If all applications are so then Issuer chooses a pair for which g 1 (g 2 ) is greatest. Then he chooses h = g 2 for the first applicant, and this way Issuer gets f (C 2 )−(g 2 (C 2 )−g 1 (g 2 ))−(f (C 2 )−g 2 (S 2 )) = g 1 (g 2 ) payoff.
In short, the applicants tell that for how much money would they complete the first task depending on the penalty, and the applied penalty for the chosen second applicant is the loss form the delayed completion, and the penalty for the first applicant is how much more the second applicant asks if he can start later. Issuer chooses the pair that gains him the most payoff.
If a first applicant has no choice in his decision tree, that is his completion time C 1 is a simple random value, then he should choose g 1 (h) = E(h(C 1 )) − c, where c is the cost plus the profit.
Case of dependent chance events
We have supposed the independence of the chances at the chance events in the model. But for events independent of the applicants -e.g. weather or the prime rate -this may not be the case. We can handle this by introducing a fictive agent whose application consists of chance events that describe the distribution of the outcomes. In the applications we replace the appropriate chance events by decisions and define the utility function as −∞ if the appropriate decision does not chosen. The responsibility for the agent introduced this way can be taken by any party, for example Issuer after estimating the chances. The responsibility can even be shared between multiple players.
Extensions for practice
This section is like an FAQ, and for those who has questions like "What if someone cares not his expected payoff?". It does not belong to the mathematical part of the paper.
Risk-averse applicants
Assume that an applicant has a strictly monoton goodness (utility) funcion g : R → R and he wants to maximize the expected value of g(payof f ). Later we will see safety use of the case when g is concave.
Definition 7 We define an application reasonable if he offers the same as in his fair application but with goodness instead of money. That is at the chance events Issuer can assign goodnesses to the branches such that their weighted mean is 0. Then Issuer has to pay the money that modifies the goodness of the applicant by the assigned goodness.
By a reasonable application, in the case of acceptance, the expected goodness of the utility of the applicant is independent of Issuer's choices. If the applications are reasonable then Issuer's payoff is fix. If the applicant is risk-neutral then the reasonable application is fair. These are some reason why reasonable applications work "quite good". We do not state that it is optimal in any sense, but a reasonable application may be better than a fair application in the risk-averse case.
We note that if g(x) = c 1 − c 2 e −λx then the evaluation works in about the same way as with fair applications.
Stability
Let us investigate the extent of the error caused by a little inaccuracy in an accepted almost fair application. As any two fair-type applications can be easily extended to equivalent ones with identical tree structures with same outcomes, inaccuracies could be considered as errors in costs and probabilities. This way only these parameters in the combined application are wrong. So all the things that can be doing badly are the decisions of the combined decision tree. Thus the expected loss is the expected value of the sum of the losses of the wrong decisions, that is the sum of the differences between the right values -evaluated using the right costs and probabilities -of the states after the good and the chosen decisions.
A wrong decision will chosen if and only if the order of the values of its branches changes. A bit inaccuracy changes the values by at most proportional amount. Assuming that the considered application is large and complex enough, this change is expected to be about proportional to the number of wrong decisions, and to the loss of each, too. Thus the caused loss expected to be only at most proportional to the square of the inaccuracy.
Notes and explications
Real applications need not be presented in this form at all. As a computer have some elementary operations, about which the user should not even know, similarly this application form is only a low-level language and a higher level language should be built on it.
It has strongly assumed that none of the chosen players know better any part of the real decision tree of any other chosen player. Because for example, it may happen that an applicant A estimates the probability of an unfavorable event in his work to be 10%, but another one, called B knows that the chance is 15%, and he also knows that he has to proceed on two different decision branches in the two cases. If the application of A is fair then B can increase the costs in his application of the less probable case by 9x and decrease the costs in the other case by x. This way, he bets 1:9 with the other applicant on an event of 15% probability.
Because of this danger, A could rightfully say that larger bet can only be increased on worse conditions. Submitting reasonable application with concave goodness function makes something similar, that is another reason to do it.
When we talk about prime cost we mean how much one could get from the money by investing it instead of contracting for this task. There are plenty of possibilities of getting profit from capital, which gives a rate of growth above which it is worth to invest, and below which it is not. So the prime cost corresponds to this rate of growth. Thus the extra profit above this is not so much.
Considering the tendering problem in isolation, if a company simply wants to make an offer for co-operation with another company then we can easily show that the best for him is offering a fair application.
Participants with limited funds
Consider a task that could cause great damage when done poorly. What shall we do with an application of a company that has not enough funds to cover the damage? We should not accept this, otherwise every big company would create a small spin-off company to apply with it, to moderate the loss in case of failure. But even if we could exclude this, an application with too little funds should not be accepted, because they would treat the danger less seriously. Someone is definitely needed who can take the whole responsibility.
Yet, it may happen that it is known that an applicant is reliable to some degree. But who knows it? If he has no funds, then he can say anything without responsibility; therefore it should not be taken into account. (Having funds can also mean that someone who has funds, even Issuer himself, takes the responsibility for our decisions. Advisory board is a usual example.) But someone who has enough funds, can offer to take the responsibility for example for an appropriate fee, maybe after making a suitable agreement with the applicant about the way of controlling. That is he can offer liability insurance. By this we get an application which has this additional insurance fee, but we can be sure that the possible damage could be compensated. Nowadays this risk is usually taken by Issuer. This is also possible here; he could fill the controlling or the insuring part. But in this function we consider him a distinct player.
There are some other ways to get such applicants involved in the project, but considering their work as it requires control. Such contract should be made in which they only take some small ratio x of the liability, and besides this, Issuer contracts another player for controlling. This player, besides a fixed fee, get the ratio x of the loss an error would have caused, if they discover and correct it, but have to pay its 1 − x ratio if they leave an error uncorrected. This way if they are able to correct an error with probability 1 − x, they could not come off badly, no matter how many errors the first player makes. And all this could be done on more levels, and the parameter x need not to be fixed in the tender announcement. It could be called for applications with these parameters free. Of course this does not exclude any kind of negotiations used in practice. Any version of this method fits perfectly to our tendering system. Of course one can not be sure that a company could pay the accidental damage, unless it puts an appropriate amount in deposit, which could not be expected. For this the conventional risk management -combined arbitrarily with the previous methods -can be used, which means again taking on the already mentioned insurance role. Thus, it should be made such a contract in that, if Issuer wants to get some x amount, the applicant agrees to pay the f (x), from which expectedly x would be actually paid. Clearly, when x is the expected worth of the company, f (x) is infinite, therefore proposals in that the loss to be paid is greater than this worth should not be accepted. Considering Issuer's risk-aversion, f could be even bigger. Of course determining f also involves responsibility, and can be handled by the method, but we omit the details.
Future improvements and research
A deficiency of the method is that, because of the large number of arising branches, the evaluation presented in the article is infeasible in practice. Actually it should be considered more as a definition than a practical algorithm. For the general case, when the structure of the trees are arbitrary, efficient algorithms are not expected.
An actual application could contain even infinitely many branches, but it should have some compact representation, as it necessarily has some transparent structure. Because of this we can expect at least good approximating algorithms for this problem. Moreover, it is possible that we can specify some conditions on the structure of the applications, which are usually satisfied, and by which efficient algorithms could be created. This should be probably the main area of further research.
As a future research, the above mentioned higher-level language of the applications has to be made. For this the already existent tendering systems should be written in this language, as the goal is that creating an application have to be as easy as possible. For example it is enough to give a description of a conventional decision tree only once, which describes that, with the progress of the work, one can make more precise estimate for the completion time, and possibly the work can be urged for extra expenses. After this an applicant only have to fill some parameters, which completes the time-related part of his application.
